We analyse with an event study approach the stock market reaction to one of the most important episodes in the global financial crisis (Lehman Brothers filing for chapter 11). Our inquiry on abnormal returns of about 2,700 stocks around the event date documents that the shock induces investors to incorporate insights from (or re-adjust the pre-event expected impact of) corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings in stock evaluation in a sort of "flight to CSR quality". The main CSR domains with significant effects on abnormal returns (corporate governance and product quality) are exactly those in which the defaulted company presented weaknesses according to its ex-ante CSR ratings. We also document that the reaction to the Lehman event extends beyond the event date and that investors rationally attribute more value to the direct information on strengths and weaknesses in each CSR rating domain than to affiliation/non affiliation to the CSR stock market index (FTSE KLD 400 Social Index). A more general result of our paper is that investors seem to discover, after the event, that CSR ratings provide original information which is not captured by traditional financial rating indicators.
Introduction
"The market's focus will now shift from estimates of write-downs, capital needs and merger and acquisition scenarios, to concerns about counterparty exposures and default risks"
Research note, Panmure Gordon & Co analyst Sandy Chen (15 September 2008) .
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 was one of the most dramatic and path-breaking events in financial history. Since the crisis is still very close, the vast amount of analyses and reflections from the press are not paralleled for the moment by a similar number of rigorous theoretical and empirical analyses in the academia.
Our paper aims to fill this gap by evaluating with an event study approach the stock market reaction to one of the most important episodes in the crisis, that is, the announcement of Lehman Brothers filing for chapter 11, occurred the 15th September 2008.
More specifically, we are interested in verifying how stock markets reacted to this specific event. Since Lehman registered negative net rating scores in corporate governance and product quality from social rating agencies, we investigate whether abnormal returns of other companies were affected by social ratings in these two domains at the event date. In this respect, another specific line of interest is whether social ratings mattered only when indirectly signaled by affiliation to a CSR index or whether investors were able to elaborate and react to such information also for non CSR index affiliated firms. We are interested in whether investors are able to exploit the superior informational content of analytic net scores on the specific CSR domains contained in the KLD database or in other similar information sets. 1, 2 Our measure of social rating is represented by one of the best-known benchmarks of social responsibility: the selection criteria used for the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index (KLD400) by the firm KLD Research and Analytics. 3 Being part of the index is undoubtedly a signal of CSR quality. However, since the index has a fixed number of constituents, exits may only be determined by a CSR downgrading or lack of representativeness due to a sharp fall in the stock market value (lack of social and financial representation according to the standard KLD definition). As a consequence, it is 1 As it is well known the literature properly defines as signals those sets of information which can be manipulated by the agents to which they are attributed. In this sense CSR ratings are a particular type of signal since their characteristics depend both on the action of the rated company and on the evaluation of such action by a third party (the rating agency). 2 Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Research & Analytics, Inc. (hereby KLD) is an investment research firm providing management tools to professionals integrating environmental, social and governance factors (ESG) into their investment decisions. KLD was acquired in 2009 by the RiskMetrics Group. 3 For further details see Appendix 1. not uncommon to have many stocks of high CSR quality which are in the waiting list. For this reason we are interested in evaluating whether investors rationally react, beyond index affiliation, to the impact of the specific KLD scores in each of the seven CSR domains. As we will document further on, our main results outline a "flight to CSR quality" effect where the rating weaknesses of Lehman Brothers (corporate governance and product quality) are the most important factors affecting abnormal returns of other stocks at the event date. We interpret these findings by arguing that the 15th September shock led investors to a different interpretation of these signals as concerning their effects on the market value of the stock.
The paper focuses on three main strands of literature. First, it contributes to the studies on the relationship between corporate governance quality and equity prices. In their influential paper Gompers et al. (2003) [27] investigate the long run effects of the Corporate Governance Quality (CGQ) index on stock returns and balance sheet indicators in the 1990s. 4 The authors observe that their analysis cannot completely solve the problem of endogeneity by disentangling direct and reverse causality nexus effects and controlling for correlation of dependent and independent variables with a third omitted driver. This is especially true for the balance sheet indicators considered by the author, which may exhibit persistence under the form of positive autocorrelation across time. Our event study looks at the problem from a different angle and in a different historical moment, thereby enriching our knowledge in this specific field. Even though observing a phenomenon and the reaction to it in a much more limited time span, it identifies a temporal and logical sequence from the event (announcement of the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy) and its effect (ex post abnormal returns of observed securities which cannot be considered as causes of the exogenous shock generated by the announcement). In the same way it is difficult to assume that a third omitted variable caused both the event and the prompt reaction to this of the stock prices under analysis. Furthermore, if the analysis on long run stock returns may be the right choice when trying to evaluate whether a given factor affects corporate financial performance over a long arc of time, the long run consequences of this global financial crisis cannot be investigated yet, while event studies are well suited to analyze the short term financial market reaction to one of the main event over the financial 4 The authors build an index based on 24 attributes and evaluate on a sample of around 1, 500 stocks the impact of the latter on several balance sheet indicators and alphas of portfolios of stocks aggregated on ascending/descending values of such index. One of the main findings in the paper is that an investment strategy which buys shares in the portfolio of stocks with highest shareholder rights, and sells those in the portfolio of stocks with lowest shareholder rights would earn around 8.5 % per year in terms of abnormal returns in the 1990s .
crisis.
Comparing our approach to the Gompers et al. (2003) [27] another imoportant difference is that (as shown in Appendix 1) the KLD concept of corporate governance quality is a bit different from that of the CGQ index. Far from being complete it is however interesting for its stronger emphasis on the issue of manager compensation policies, a question on which the public opinion became much more sensitive after the crisis.
A second strand of the literature to which our paper aims to contribute is the relationship between product quality and stock market performance. The empirical literature in this field has mainly focused its attention over product recalls effect (meant as negative signals on product quality) on stock market performance. The main empirical analyses focused on drug and automobile recalls and found most of times negative abnormal returns around the event date [37] . In general, the stock market reaction is shown to exceed the actual ex post costs due to recalls and the excess loss is interpreted by authors as a loss of "goodwill" (reputation). 5 Finally, we contribute to the literature of corporate social responsibility and stock performance. Corporate social responsibility may be viewed as an enhanced concern in corporate strategies for the environment and for stakeholders different from shareholders (mainly consumers, workers, suppliers and local communities). 6, 7 As it can be clearly observed in the KLD criteria which will be used in our empirical analysis, enhanced stakeholders' satisfaction implies in most cases higher costs for firms which decide to pursue more rigorous policies (i.e., on waste management and polluting emissions, on workers satisfaction, and on philanthropic activities in favor of local or more distant communities). 8 These extra costs can be compensated by at least five potential benefits. First, CSR may be seen as an optimal strategy to minimize transaction costs with stakeholders (Freeman, 1984 [22] ). In a country like the US where class actions facilitate legal action against corporations this is an important issue. Second, it may gain the favor of "concerned" consumers who are willing to pay for the CSR intangible values (i.e. environmental friendliness) incorporated in the products and services sold by the firm. 9 Third, workers productivity may be higher for 5 Another widely investigated event which has been analysed and interpreted as a signal of product quality is airline crashes (see among others Chalk, 1987[14] ; Borenstein and Zimmerman, 1988[8] and Bosch, Eckard and Singal, 1988[9] ). 6 Concern for the environment may be as well seen as concern for consequences of its degradation on local communities and future generations. 7 Among seminal contributions in the debate on pros and cons of the CSR approach see Friedman (1962) [24] and Freeman (1984) [22] . A reflection on methodological problems which may arise when pursuing the goal of maximization of multiple stakeholders interests can be found in Jensen (1986) [29] and Tirole (2001) [40] . 8 The only cost decreasing element in KLD criteria is probably the limit to managerial compensations. 9 For empirical tests on the willingness to pay for intangible social and environmental at least two reasons: i) the effect of enhanced wage and non wage benefits according to the traditional efficiency wage theories and ii) the increased intrinsic motivations due to the reduced gap between worker ideals and corporate goals. 10, 11 A recent empirical test on this third potential benefit of CSR policies is provided by Edmans (2009) [18] who finds that those who are regarded as top US companies in terms of workers' satisfaction earned an annual four-factors alpha of 4% from 1984-2005. Fourth, CSR may foster innovation (i.e. in developing more efficient energy saving processes), thereby creating a technological leadership and a competitive advantage. Fifth and last, it may be a signal of product quality in a framework of asymmetric information given that one of the main stakeholder categories to which CSR refers is that of consumers (product quality is indeed one of the eight KLD CSR domains). The above mentioned results on abnormal returns related to product recalls may be related to this point.
Given this uncertain balance between costs and benefits it is no wonder that the empirical evidence on the relationship between CSR and (non financial) corporate performance is mixed. 12 The same occurs if we specifically focus on stock market performance measuring the consequences of CSR choices on shareholders' wealth.
The interest for empirical research in this area is growing since almost 1 out of 9 dollars invested in total assets under management in the US are subject to a CSR screening. 13 Among recent contributions Barnea and Rubin (2005) [4] document that CSR investment is negatively related to insider ownership. The authors formulate an overinvestment hypothesis to interpret their findings: CSR positively affects shareholder value up to a given level. Insiders however overinvest in this for reputational purposes and in partcular when their ownership share is low.
values of products revealed in consumer purchases see Becchetti and Rosati (2007) [7] . An interesting theorization of this phenomenon in oligopolies in which some companies "retail public goods" is in Ghatak and Besley (2007) [26] . 10 See, among others, Yellen (1984) [41] , Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) [38] and Akerlof (1982) [1] for shirking, turnover and gift exchange models. 11 On the relationship between workers' intrinsic motivation and productivity see Ryan et al. (1991), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) [23] and Kreps (1997) [31] . 12 As it is obvious results in this field crucially depend on time period, selected sample and performance variable and adopted methodologies. For evidence of a positive link see, among others, Ruf et al. (2001) [35] . Inconclusive findings are in McWilliams and Siegel (2001) [32] Aupperle, Caroll and Hatfield (1985) [2] . Negative links are found among others by Preston and O'Bannon (1997) [33] and Freedman and Jaggi (1986) [21] . 13 The Report on Social Investing Trends (last available 2007) calculates that there were 2.71 trillion in the same year (increasing from 2.29 trillion in 2005) invested in total assets under management which use one or more of the three core socially responsible investing strategies-screening, shareholder advocacy, and community investing. http : //www.socialinvest.org/pdf /SRI T rends ExecSummary 2007.pdf (accessed 24th April 2010).
The relative performance of CSR and non CSR stocks is analyzed mainly by looking at ethically managed and non ethically managed investment funds. Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2002) [5] compare active strategies of the two types of funds obtaining mixed findings even though they document a learning process which gradually improves the performance of ethical investment fund managers. Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2005) [25] evaluate the specific cost of ethical fund management (that is, the restriction of the universe of investable stocks to those which meet socially responsible investment constraints) in terms of risk adjusted returns. Such cost it is shown to depend on the share of SR investment, views about asset pricing models (SR funds are less able to offer exposure to size and value factors than to the standard one CAPM factor) and the ability of stock managers. 14 Back to the theoretical rationales advanced to interpret the relative performance of CSR stocks, the specificity of the Lehman event (and the nexus between its failure and ex ante CSR corporate governance and product quality ratings) is that it may have unveiled to market investors the importance of the first (minimization of transaction costs with stakeholders) and fifth (CSR as a signal of product quality) potential beneficial effects of CSR on corporate performance, thereby leading to an upward (downward) correction of the value of stocks with good (bad) CSR scores. This is what we aim to test in this paper which is divided into five sections (including introduction and conclusions). The second section describes more in detail the event under inquiry. Section 3 shortly presents our methodological approach. Section 4 illustrates econometric findings, while some interpretations of them are provided in section 5. The sixth section concludes.
The Lehman event
Lehman Brothers risky position before the crisis can be resumed by its 31 : 1 leverage ratio. Such ratio implies that a 3 − 4% reduction in the value of its assets would eliminate its equity or book value. 15 Another main worry about Lehman was its asset liability mismatch. The SFAS 157 accounting rule on Fair Value classifies assets and liabilities in three levels in ascending order of liquidity (Level I very liquid and easy to value and Level III illiquid and hard to value). Before the crisis Lehman had a dominant share of illiquid assets (218 out of 291 billion dollars) against mainly liquid liabilities (109 out of 149 billion were Level I). Third, as it is well known, Lehman was overexposed in securitizing residential mortgages (246 billions between 2006 and 2007). In spite of the monthly payment/income ratio for most mortgage holders was unsustainable, this did not weaken the incentive to lend for banks given the passage from the "originate to hold" to the "originate to distribute" model which eliminated the standard arm length relationship between lender and borrower. Even though worries about the company led to a sharp drop of its stock price even before Chapter 11, there were hopes for a different solution (i.e., a sale to Bank of America and Barclays) until the event date. Above all, no previous failures of the largest financial intermediaries had challenged the "too big to fail" assumption according to which large financial intermediaries should not be left go bankrupt due to the systemic consequences of their failure. First anticipations that Lehman Brothers was filing for Chapter 11 arrived at 7 am of the 15th September 2008. The official release of the news was at 11.43.
As it is well known the Lehman Brothers' default severely increased coun-terparty risk since the failed company had $729 billion of notional derivative contracts, amounting to an estimated fair value of around $16.6 billion at the event date. The same company disclosed to have $25.6 billion of overthe-counter currency, interest rate and credit default swaps. An even bigger problem was about the credit default swaps written on Lehman debt amounted to around $350 billion. The settlement of these contracts would have probably triggered the default of the insuring party.
The above described linkages among Lehman Brothers and many other actors in financial markets and the risk of additional defaults, coupled with the uncertainty on the rescue plans from governments and central banks to avoid a collapse of the payment system, worked out with the pursue of a −4.7% loss of the SP index at the event date. As shown in Figure 1 the event marks the beginning of a dramatic plunge of the Index in the following month.
Given the event characteristics we expect that abnormal returns on other stocks (the object of our inquiry) might depend on three main factors: i) a direct involvement as insuring party in the CDS contracts on the Lehman debt; ii) a more general undisclosed presence of risky over-the-counter derivatives in the balance sheets of such companies; iii) an indirect link generated by the correlation in ex ante rating weaknesses between Lehman Brother and observed stocks. In this regard it is worthful shed light over the fact that the KLD social rating used in our analysis registered, before the crisis, concerns on Lehman Brothers. In fact KLD assigned to Lehman negative net scores in the two domains of corporate governance and product quality concerns (see section 3). The purpose of our paper is therefore to test whether investors reacted with a "flight to CSR quality" by punishing companies with weaknesses in the same two domains or, more generally, in all KLD domains.
Our theoretical hypotheses
Given the characteristics of the above mentioned event, our assumption is that the Lehman episode led investors to reassess (and increase) the weight of the impact CSR quality signals on the fundamental value of stocks.
Let us assume that investors evaluate stocks according to a standard discounted dividend approach in which the stock price is
where D 0 is the current dividend and E[g t ] is the yearly expected rate of growth of dividends. As it is well known this standard approach becomes much more complex if we decompose life of the firm into a high growth period which is limited in time and followed by a "normal" one where the stock behaves as a terminal bond and grows forever at the rate of growth of the economy (Claus and Thomas, 2001[15] ). What practitioners use to calculate the denominator is generally a proxy of a risk-free rate plus an estimate of the risk premium multiplied by exposition to systematic non-diversifiable risk of the industry stocks.
Investors are imperfectly informed and can use at the nominator the expected growth rate of earnings derived from consensus forecast of I/B/E/S analysts on one and two periods ahead earnings per share -that can be considered the observed variable which is more akin to the rational expectations concept (Keane and Runkle, 1998[30] ) -as proxies of the expected rate of growth of dividends.
It is reasonable to assume that the reliability of such forecasts (and investors' confidence in them) depends on the investors' perception of corporate trustworthiness. In this sense, we expect that, within KLD CRS domains, scores in corporate governance and product quality became signals of corporate trustworthiness increasingly taken into account by investors after the Lehman event. Fasan and Mio [20] provide three interesting explanations of the channels through which this may occur. First, Lehman Brothers was weak in corporate governance and product quality domains in the KLD ratings. Investors therefore may start interpreting after the event positive net scores in such domains as signals of corporate reputation which reduce the probability of negative surprises such as those leading Lehman Brothers to default (see the introductory caption of section 1).
Second, the Lehman shock increased demand for transparency (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987[16] ) from non investor stakeholders. In this perspective investors interpreted higher CSR scores as signals of higher corporate capacity in dealing with such claims.
Third, (in a sort of second order effect) financial analysts not directly demanding higher transparency may have considered after the event that closer and more trustworthy relationships with stakeholders (signaled by higher CSR scores) could reduce the post crisis costs generated by the fall of trust which would negatively affect economic relationships between corporations and some of their stakeholders (such as clients and suppliers). In this case good CSR ratings are expected to reduce (or to increase relatively less than in firms with bad CSR ratings) transaction costs with stakeholders after the event. Lehman Brothers registers a zero level of strengths in both Product Quality and Corporate Governance whether it has −1 and −2 respectively in Product Quality and Corporate Governance concern, according to last KLD release. 16 Due to these reasons we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: CSR net scores (algebraic sum of strengths and weaknesses) posi- 16 See Table 1 -3 for detailed statistics.
tively affect abnormal returns of observed stocks at the Lehman event date.
H2: the two stronger CSR signals affecting abnormal returns are those on which Lehman was weaker according to pre-crisis KLD ratings (corporate governance and product quality) H3: financial analysts efficiently exploit CSR information: the significance of direct analytic scores on CSR strengths and weaknesses of the KLD database dominates that of affiliation to a CSR stock market index.
Methodological approach
The event window represents the period of interest over which the impact of an event is measured. The more days are included in the event window, the lower is the power of the methodology (Brown and Warner, 1980) [11] . In our case we select a five days event window. Considering the nature of this unexpected event, abnormal returns are calculated starting from the day prior the event (in order to take into account for eventual anticipation of the news) so the event window is (-1;+3) with 0 as event day.
In order to compute normal returns of the stock we use the standard market model. We estimate the model with a six months window ending two days before the event. Our selected specification is therefore:
where τ is the estimation window interval, R iτ and R mτ are the compounded continues returns in τ of the security i in market m, respectively, and iτ is the zero mean disturbance term. In the literature the simple market model generally provides results which are robust to estimation of "normal returns" with its most common alternatives (Fama-French three factor models [19] , other multifactor models, ARCH/GARCH models). 17 This is because such alternatives have much higher probability of statistically insignificant parameters and therefore much higher noise on the normal return which is automatically transferred in the measure of the abnormal return (Brown-Warner, 1985[12] ; Campbell et al., 1997 [13] ).
The estimation window length is a key decision to take in event studies. If the normal market return model structure is expected to vary frequently across time (i.e. due time varying betas), a too long window may miss that change under-representing the more recent normal market return structure. On the other hand, a too short estimation window may have not enough degrees of freedom to properly capture the model structure. Being aware of it, our first choice is a six months window, followed by a robustness check to control whether our results are confirmed with a shorter (2 months) window. 18 Using the market model as the normal performance return model, abnormal return is the residual between the observed and the predicted return, as follows:
where AR is calculated in the event window, whileα i andβ i are coefficients estimated in (1) . A subsequent step is to regress the defined abnormal returns on their potential determinants which include CSR ratings (see section 4.3). The specifications are estimated with OLS with White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The latter allow to take into account the problem of spatial heteroskedasticity which is typical in short run propagation mechanisms around a crisis event.
Data Definition
Our sample consists of 2, 736 US listed stock companies. Daily prices, trading volumes, industry sectors (according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)) and number of employees (as a proxy for industry size) have been collected using Thomson Reuters Datastream. 19 Daily returns are calculated as continuously compounded returns, that is, as the natural log of the ratio between P t and P t−1 .
Affiliation to FTSE KLD 400 Social Index comes from KLD historical spreadsheets (last 2007 release before the crisis) as well as social rating. The Index FTSE KLD 400 Social Index is a market-capitalization-weighted stock index whose constituents are 400 publicly traded US companies that have met high standards of social and environmental excellence. KLD provides scores on strengths and weaknesses for sample stocks on seven specific domains i) community; ii) corporate governance; iii) diversity; iv) employee relations; v) environment; vi) human rights; and vii) product quality; 20 We define the variable netstrength as the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns for all possible CSR domain according to KLD rating. Furthermore we create net indicators (netstrengths i , where i stands for community, 18 All results in the rest of the paper are robust for a different estimation window (2 months) as well as for truncated distributions of AR(0) (1 st and 99 th centile) for both estimation windows. Moreover results are robust when we balance the sample with respect to industry sectors and size (proxied by the number of employees). For further details see Section 4.3. 19 According to ICB industry sectors are: Basic Materials; Consumer Goods; Consumer Services; Financials; Healthcare; Industrials; Oil & Gas; Technology; Telecommunications; Utilities. 20 Additional scores are provided for involvement in controversial business issues (alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, tobacco). Details on KLD criteria are provided in Appendix 1.
corporate governance, diversity, employee, environment, human rights and product) for each of the above domains i) to viii) as the algebraic sum between each domain strength and each domain concern (see Table 2 for variables descriptive details).
Finally, news concerning Lehman Brothers, its timing and previous information about the company have been collected using Dow Jones Factiva.
Descriptive Findings
In Tables 1 − 3 we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. Table 1 documents that the average abnormal return across sample stocks is much higher at the event day (0.7%) than the day before (0.03%) and the day after (0.1%). Median abnormal returns express an even stronger difference between day before, day after and day of the event (−0.1%, 0.2% and 1.2% respectively). Descriptive statistics suggest that there is something not included in the "normal return" model at the event date. Econometric findings in the following section will provide evidence consistent with these first descriptive indications showing that the impact of the event is not anticipated but in some cases persists after the event date. If we consider net KLD strengths reported in Table 2 (sum of strengths minus sum of weaknesses, defined as netstrengths i ) we find that the range shrinks going from −11 to 15, whereas we see that, when aggregating KLD scores on the 8 CSR domains (the variable totstr is the sum of strengths in the 8 domains whereas totcon is the sum of concerns), the maximum is 17 for weaknesses and 22 for strengths. Looking at specific domains we find that both corporate governance and product quality range from -4 to +2. 21 More in general, Tables 3 provide extreme values for strength and concerns for each individual CSR domain. Minima and maxima reported in these tables will be used to calculate the maximum magnitude of the impact of a given CRS domain in our econometric findings. The maximum magnitude is exactly the difference in abnormal returns between two stocks located at the two extremes of the value range. Finally, descriptive statistics of the natural log of employee variable (logemployee) which will be used in the econometric analysis as a proxy for industry size, are also provided in Table 3 .
Econometric Findings
With our econometric analysis we aim to test the three hypotheses formulated in Section 3.
In order to test the first hypothesis we regress abnormal returns calculated at different intervals around the event date -AR(-1), AR(0), AR(+1), AR(+2), AR(+3) and CAR(0;+1) and CAR(0;+2) -on our netstrength variable, that is, the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns from all possible CSR domains.
We estimate the effect of the aggregate netstrength variable on abnormal returns of the observed stocks under two different specifications which include among controls: i) logemployees as a proxy of firms size; ii) industry dummies. Without industry dummies (first specification) we have significant abnormal returns from the day before the event to the day +2, with positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns for CAR(0;+2) and CAR (0;+1) ( Table 4 , columns 1-7). The anomaly of the negative abnormal return the day before the event disappears when we include industry dummies (second specification). In the augmented specification the effect is now positive and significant in the event date and the day after, even though with smaller magnitude ( Table 4 , columns [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . The hypothesis of the significant impact of the CSR scores on abnormal returns at the event date is therefore supported by our data.
Among other regressors the size variable (logemployee) is negative and significant in days +1, +2 and +3 after controlling for industry dummies. 22 Moving from statistical to economic significance we focus on the event day effect in specification ii) finding that the maximum difference in magnitude of abnormal returns for two firms set at the two extremes of the total strength/weaknesses distribution -two firms with the worst and the best possible CSR rating -is 5.07% (3.38% if we consider the distribution represented by the observed extremes of the net strength variable). The same two numbers for the CAR (0;+2) are respectively 11.39% and 7.54%.
In order to test hypothesis two we replace in Table 5 the aggregate netstrength indicator with net scores (netstrengths i ), namely strengths minus concerns recorded on each of the seven fields of CSR (community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, product quality).
Results from estimates of the new specification clearly outline that the two strongest and more persistent effects are those from corporate governance and product quality indicators (netcgov and netpro, the two CSR features on which Lehman had net negative scores). The corporate governance effect lasts three days (from the day before to the day after) and is positive and significant. The product quality effect materializes from day 0 to day 2. All other CSR domains (with the exception of environment the day before the event) are not significant if we look at the specification which includes industry dummies ( Table 5 , columns 8 − 14). Cumulative abnormal returns are positive and strongly significant only for the corporate governance and product quality variables. Results from Table 5 support hypothesis two (H2) arguing that the effect is concentrated on the CSR domains in which Lehman was weaker.
The effect magnitude of the significant net scores over specific CSR domains is again not negligible (the estimate in column 4 correcting for industry dummies implies that a unit change in the corporate governance (product quality) net score generates a 1% (1.4%) CAR(0;+2)). This implies a difference in abnormal returns of 3.59% for the AR(0) and 7.02% for the CAR(0;+2) for two stocks located respectively at the left to the right extreme of the net corporate governance indicator. For the product quality indicator the same two numbers are 3.19% and 10.15%.
In order to test hypothesis three (H3) we add a dummy for stocks included in the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index (reported as domini in Tables 6, and 7) to evaluate the relative weight given by investors to information from analytic CSR scores visá vis information from CSR index affiliation. The hypothesis on the significance of this variable may be seen as a test on the relevance of passive investors buy and hold strategies on the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index. The domini dummy is neither significant in the specification with the aggregate net strength indicator (Table 6) , nor in that with net strengths for individual CSR domains ( Table 7 ). These findings confirm that investors demonstrate to have access to analytic CSR scores and exploit their higher informative content.
What we have assumed so far by creating a unique net strength index is that the stock market reaction to strengths and weaknesses is symmetric. In Table 8 we disaggregate strengths and concerns of different CSR domains and find that reaction to concerns lasts more than that to strengths. More specifically corporate governance concerns ((cgovcon) have a three days effect (from the day before to two days after the event date), while corporate governance strengths (cgovstr ) are significant only at the event day. Cumulative average abnormal returns are however not so dissimilar. The difference between the strength and the concern indicators in the product quality domain is starker. The impact of the event on product quality lasts three days when we look at concerns (procon) while it is not significant when we consider strengths (prostr ). The CAR(0;+2) attributable to the concern indicator is 1.09%.
We interpret this asymmetry as related to the fact that concerns impact on downside price risk and probability of default and therefore affect the reassessment of the stock evaluation after the Lehman Brothers event more than strengths (see again the introductory caption in section 1).
Robustness check
As it is well known in event studies researchers have to take several discriminating decisions about lengths of estimation and event window, normal market return model and definition of the sample. To make an example, the trade-off in the length of the estimation window depends on the speed with which normal market models may vary across time. A longer estimation window provides more observations for the estimate of the market model (and therefore a medium-long run average beta of the stock) but does not capture possible structural breaks and variations of the model at closer distance from the event window. This is why we repeat our estimates by considering a shorter estimation window of two months. In what follows we show evidence from our robustness checks only for the most relevant results commented in section 4.3. Full details are available upon request.
Our findings are substantially unaltered for 6-month and 2-month estimation windows; in fact for instance both net corporate governance (netcgov ) and net product (netpro) remain significant at 5% for CAR(0;+2) (net corporate governance slightly decrease from 1.09% to 0.62% while net product quality goes from 1.42% to 1.41%).
As a second robustness check we truncate the distribution of abnormal returns at 1 st and 99 th centile in both 6-months and 2-months estimation windows in order to eliminate potential outliers from our estimate ( Table  9 ). 23 Results are also robust for balanced sample as previously specified (see Section 4.1).
Finally, we run parametric, and non parametric (sign) tests for corporate governance strength (cgovstr ) and concern (cgovcon) and product concern (procon). 24 When variables are not dummies, we run test using the 60 th centile as benchmark to define our sub-sample. Results are reported in Table 10 .
Interpretations of our findings
As in any event study an abnormal return may be determined by the impact of the event or by a reassessment of the stand alone value of the stock. Our argument is that CSR rated quality is a signal of both. 23 Results are substantially unaltered using the cut-off methodology over abnormal returns instead of the truncated distribution. 24 The parametric test J2 is J2 = ( N (L 1 −4) L 1 −2 ) 1 2 SCAR(T1, T2) ≈ N (0, 1). We decided to use J2 instead of J1 because of its own characteristics; in fact J2 is corrected by
The correction factor, gives a higher weight to the observations with low variance and thereby allows to observe not only the test-significance in each scenario, but the range of the variation from a scenario to another one. Non parametric sign test is In the first case the event itself creates a more risky financial market environment which affects stock evaluation (and risk of default). The market value revision may be proportional to the rated corporate governance quality, which is interpreted as a proxy of the counterparty risk run by the firm (i.e. weight of positions in financial derivatives). The point here is that such increased risk, when evaluated around the event date, cannot be captured by a higher exposition to systematic non-diversifiable risk (beta) since the normal return model is estimated in the estimation window before the event date.
In the second case (reassessment of the stand alone value) our result may be determined by the fact that financial analysts correct their underestimation of the importance of social responsibility and quality of corporate governance in terms of signals of reduced default risk in a framework of asymmetric information. The fact that the CSR factors which are more significant are corporate governance and product quality (the only two factors on which Lehman Brothers had net negative scores) is consistent with this interpretation. It is not possible to disentangle these two (impact of the event and reassessment of the stand alone value) effects also because they are strictly correlated.
Another relevant finding in our estimate is the slow market reaction to the event. In the Lehman story both anticipating news and the official release occur in the same trading day (15th of September) so that the 16th of September is definitely a post event trading day. In spite of it, we observe that in many estimates (see Tables 4 − 8) the reaction continues in this and in the following day with abnormal returns which are mostly in the same direction of the event day. The phenomenon of slow market reaction has been thoroughly investigated in the recent financial literature and three main explanations are considered here. First, Daniel et al. [17] point to overconfidence and biased self-attribution by assuming that investors overreact to private and underreact to public information. A second line of thought (Barberis et al., 1998) [3] hinges on representative heuristics and argue that investors overreact to news. A third approach (Hong and Stein, 1999 [28] ) assumes the existence of two types of traders. The first look at news while the second reacts only to prices. This implies underreaction (only the first group reacts to the news) and subsequent overreaction (the second group react to price changes).
Conclusions
Corporate governance and product quality are two fundamental factors affecting corporate performance and the stock market value of a stock. In a framework of asymmetric information investors are imperfectly informed about these two factors and have to formulate their expectations by extract-ing signals on them. One of the sources of these signals is provided by CSR ratings.
The hypothesis set forth in our paper is that the Lehman Brothers event (the failure of such an important company which exhibited positive financial rating but negative CSR rating on corporate governance and product quality) may have led investors to reassess the value of the stocks by increasing the weight attributed to specific CSR information or to consider a stronger negative impact of the event on stocks with similar weaknesses.
Our empirical findings demonstrate that, by using the same sources which produced the above mentioned negative ratings on Lehman (the KLD database), net strengths on corporate governance and product quality generate significant abnormal returns around the event date on a sample of around 2, 700 stocks listed in the US stock exchange. We also document that investors do not react to stock inclusion in the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index but rationally look at the single analytical scores and attribute, among them, more weight to the two (corporate governance and product quality) in which Lehman was weaker. This can be also explained by the fact that CSR index affiliation is a weaker signal which contains a lot of noise due to the fixed number of index constituents problem and to the existence of a waiting list of top CSR firms which are not included in the index. 25 Another important element in our results is that financial market reaction to the shock extends beyond the event date. This is consistent (among other possible interpretations) with the hypothesis of a heterogeneous market microstructure in which more informed traders react first and a group of followers, looking just at price signals, react secondly once observed the price dynamics.
A more general result of our paper is that investors seem to discover, after the event, that CSR ratings perform a crucial role in financial markets by providing original information which is not captured by traditional financial rating indicators. netstr is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in all possible CSR domains according to KLD rating. netcom is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in the community domain according to KLD rating. netcgov is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in the corporate governance domain according to KLD rating. netdiv is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in the diversity domain according to KLD rating. netemp is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in the employee domain according to KLD rating. netenv is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in the environment domain according to KLD rating. nethum is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in the human rights domain according to KLD rating. netpro is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in the product quality domain according to KLD rating. totstr is the sum of each strength for each company in the sample according to KLD rating. totcon is the sum of each concern for each company in the sample according to KLD rating. comstr is the level of strengths in the community domain according to KLD rating. cgovstr is the level of strengths in the corporate governance domain according to KLD rating. divstr is the level of strengths in the diversity domain according to KLD rating. empstr is the level of strengths in the corporate employee domain according to KLD rating. envstr is the level of strengths in the environment domain according to KLD rating. humstr is the level of strengths in the corporate human rights domain according to KLD rating. prostr is the level of strengths from product quality domain according to KLD rating. comcon is the level of concerns in the community domain according to KLD rating. cgovcon is the level of concerns in the corporate governance domain according to KLD rating. divcon is the level of concerns in the diversity domain according to KLD rating. empcon is the level of concerns in the corporate employee domain according to KLD rating. envcon is the level of concerns in the environment domain according to KLD rating. humcon is the level of concerns in the corporate human rights domain according to KLD rating. procon is the level of concerns in the product quality domain according to KLD rating. logemployee is natural log of employee. The The table illustrates results from estimates of the following model: (C)AR
Where abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of various length are the dependent variables in different columns. netstr is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns from all possible CSR domain according to KLD rating. domini is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the company belongs only to FTSE KLD 400 or to both FTSE KLD 400 and S&P 500 and 0 otherwise according to KLD rating. logemployee is the natural log of the number of employees. industry dummies variables take value 1 if the company belongs to that particular industry according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated with OLS and White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Abnormal returns are calculated as AR The table illustrates results from estimates of the following model: (C)AR
Where abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of various length are the dependent variables in different columns. netstrs represents for each CSR domain the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns according to KLD rating, where i stands for community, corporate governance, diversity, employee, environment, human rights and product. domini is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the company belongs only to FTSE KLD 400 or to both FTSE KLD 400 and S&P 500 and 0 otherwise. logemployee is the natural log of the number of employees. industry dummies variables take value 1 if the company belongs to that particular industry according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated with OLS and White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Abnormal returns are calculated as AR 
(3)
(8) the sum of any sub-strength for each company i in the sample according to KLD rating where str stands for community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product quality. concerns represent the sum of any sub-concern for each company i in the sample according to KLD rating where con stands for community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product quality. logemployee is the natural log of the number of employees. industry dummies variables take value 1 if the company belongs to that particular industry, according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated with OLS and White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Abnormal returns are calculated as AR The table reports results of a robustness check on the significance of coefficients of product quality and corporate governance strengths and concerns with 6-month and 2-month estimation windows and by controlling for outliers (distributions of abnormal returns truncated at 1 st and 99 th centiles). For details on the estimated model and variable legend see Table 8 . The parametric test J 2 is calculated as J 2 = (
is the correction factor that gives a higher weight to the observations with low variance and thereby allows to observe not only the test-significance in each scenario, but the range of the variation from a scenario to another one. The null hypothesis of the absence of significant abnormal returns is rejected when J 2 ≥ 1.645. The nonparametric sign test (J 3 ) is calculated as N (0, 1) . Where N is the total number of events and N * is the number of events with negative (cumulative) abnormal returns. The null hypothesis of the absence of significant abnormal returns is rejected when P |t| ≤ 0.05.
incinerators, or other company actions that adversely affect the quality of life, tax base, or property values in the community. Indigenous People Relations (COM-con-C). The company has been involved in serious controversies with indigenous people that indicate the company has not respected the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous people [added in 2000; in 2002 moved into the Human Rights area]. Disputes (COM-con-D). The company has recently been involved in major tax disputes involving Federal, state, local or non-U.S. government authorities, or is involved in controversies over its tax obligations to the community [entered in 1991; in 2005 moved into the Community area].Other Concern (COM-con-X). The company is involved with a controversy that has mobilized community opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy community controversies.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRENGTHS:
Limited Compensation(CGOV-str-A). The company has recently awarded notably low levels of compensation to its top management or its board members. The limit for a rating is total compensation of less than $500, 000 per year for a CEO or $30, 000 per year for outside directors. Ownership Strength(CGOV-str-C). The company owns between 20% and 50% of another company KLD has cited as having an area of social strength, or is more than 20% owned by a firm that KLD has rated as having social strengths. When a company owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling interest, and KLD treats the second firm as if it is a division of the first. Transparency Strength(CGOV-str-D). The company is particularly effective in reporting on a wide range of social and environmental performance measures, or is exceptional in reporting on one particular measure [added in 2006; this strength incorporates information from the former Environment: Communications Strength (ENV-str-E) as part of its content.].Accountability Strength (CGOV-str-E). The company has shown markedly responsible leadership on public policy issues and/or has an exceptional record of transparency and accountability concerning its political involvement in state or federal-level U.S. politics, or in non-U.S. politics [added in 2006] . Other Strength(CGOV-str-X). The company has an innovative compensation plan for its board or executives, a unique and positive corporate culture, or some other initiative not covered by other KLD ratings.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONCERNS: High Compensation (CGOV-con-B). The company has recently awarded notably high levels of compensation to its top management or its board members. The limit for a rating is total compensation of more than $10million per year for a CEO or $100, 000 per year for outside directors. Ownership Concern (CGOV-con-F). The company owns between 20% and 50% of a company KLD has cited as having an area of social concern, or is more than 20% owned by a firm KLD has rated as having areas of concern. When a company owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling interest, and KLD treats the second firm as if it is a division of the first. Accounting Concern (CGOV-con-G). The company is involved in significant accounting related controversies [added in 2006] . Transparency Concern (CGOVcon-H). The company is distinctly weak in reporting on a wide range of social and environmental performance measures [added in 2006] . Political Accountability Concern (CGOV-con-I). The company has been involved in noteworthy controversies on public policy issues and/or has a very poor record of transparency and accountability concerning its political involvement in state or federal level U.S. politics, or in non-U.S. politics [added in 2006].Other Concern (CGOV-con-X). The company restated its earnings over an accounting controversy, has other accounting problems, or is involved with some other controversy not covered by other KLD ratings.
DIVERSITY STRENGTHS:
CEO (DIV-str-A). The company's chief executive officer is a woman or a member of a minority group. Promotion (DIV-str-B). The company has made notable progress in the promotion of women and minorities, particularly to line positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation. Board of Directors (DIV-str-C). Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats or more (with no double counting) on the board of directors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the board numbers less than 12. Work/Life Benefits (DIV-str-D). The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs addressing work/life concerns, e.g., child care, elder care, or flextime [entered in 1991 with the name Family Benefits Strength, it was renamed in 2005]. Women & Minority Contracting (DIV-str-E). The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting, or otherwise has a demonstrably strong record on purchasing or contracting, with women-and/or minority-owned businesses. Employment of the Disabled (DIV-str-F). The company has implemented innovative hiring programs, other innovative human resource programs for the disabled, or otherwise has a superior reputation as an employer of the disabled. Gay & Lesbian Policies (DIV-str-G). The company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian employees. In particular, it provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees [entered in 1991 with the name Progressive Gay/Lesbian Policies strength, it was renamed in 1995]. Other Strength (DIV-str-X). The company has made a notable commitment to diversity that is not covered by other KLD ratings.
DIVERSITY CONCERNS: Controversies (DIV-con-A). The company has either paid substantial fines or civil penalties as a result of affirmative action controversies, or has otherwise been involved in major controversies related to affirmative action issues. Non-Representation (DIV-con-B). The company has no women on its board of directors or among its senior line managers. Other Con-has notably strong pollution prevention programs including both emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs. Recycling (ENV-str-C). The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw materials in its manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the recycling industry. Clean Energy(ENV-str-D). The company has taken significant measures to reduce its impact on climate change and air pollution through use of renewable energy and clean fuels or through energy efficiency. The company has demonstrated a commitment to promoting climate-friendly policies and practices outside its own operations [entered in 1991 it was renamed from Alternative Fuel Strength]. Communications (ENV-str-E). The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably substantive environmental report, or has notably effective internal communications systems in place for environmental best practices. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS: Hazardous Waste (ENV-con-A). The company's liabilities for hazardous waste sites exceed $50million, or the company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for waste management violations. Regulatory Problems. (ENV-con-B) The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, or it has a pattern of regulatory controversies under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act or other major environmental regulations. Ozone Depleting Chemicals. (ENV-con-C). The company is among the top manufacturers of ozone depleting chemicals such as HCFCs, methyl chloroform, methylene chloride, or bromines. Substantial Emissions. (ENV-con-D). The company's legal emissions of toxic chemicals (as defined by and reported to the EPA) from individual plants into the air and water are among the highest of the companies followed by KLD. Agricultural Chemicals. (ENVcon-E). The company is a substantial producer of agricultural chemicals, i.e., pesticides or chemical fertilizers. Climate Change. (ENV-con-F). The company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products, or the company derives substantial revenues indirectly from the combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products. Such companies include electric utilities, transportation companies with fleets of vehicles, auto and truck manufacturers, and other transportation equipment companies. Other Concern. (ENV-con-X). The company sion the provision of products or services for the economically disadvantaged. Other Strength (PRO-str-X). The company's products have notable social benefits that are highly unusual or unique for its industry.
PRODUCT CONCERNS: Product Safety (PRO-con-A). The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties, or is involved in major recent controversies or regulatory actions, relating to the safety of its products and services. Marketing/Contracting Concern (PRO-con-D). The company has recently been involved in major marketing or contracting controversies, or has paid substantial fines or civil penalties relating to advertising practices, consumer fraud, or government contracting. (Formerly: Marketing/Contracting Controversy). Antitrust (PRO-con-E). The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for antitrust violations such as price fixing, collusion, or predatory pricing, or is involved in recent major controversies or regulatory actions relating to antitrust allegations. Other Concern (PRO-con-X). The company has major controversies with its franchises, is an electric utility with nuclear safety problems, defective product issues, or is involved in other product related controversies not covered by other KLD ratings.
ALCOHOL (ALC-con-A) : Licensing. The company licenses its company or brand name to alcohol products. Manufacturers. Companies that are involved in the manufacture alcoholic beverages including beer, distilled spirits, or wine. Manufacturers of Products Necessary for Production of Alcoholic Beverages. Companies that derive 15% or more of total revenues from the supply of raw materials and other products necessary for the production of alcoholic beverages. Retailers. Companies that derive 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (wholesale or retail) of alcoholic beverages. Ownership by an Alcohol Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company with alcohol involvement. Ownership of an Alcohol Company. The company owns more than 20% of another company with alcohol involvement. (When a company owns more than 50% of company with alcohol involvement, KLD treats the alcohol company as a consolidated subsidiary.) (ALC-con-X): Alcohol Other Concern. The company derives substantial revenues from the activities closely associated with the production of alcoholic beverages [KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002].
GAMBLING (GAM-con-A): Licensing. The company licenses its company or brand name to gambling products. Manufacturers. Companies that produce goods used exclusively for gambling, such as slot machines, roulette wheels, or lottery terminals. Owners and Operators. Companies that own and/or operate casinos, racetracks, bingo parlors, or other betting establishments, including casinos; horse, dog, or other race tracks that per-mit wagering; lottery operations; on-line gambling; pari-mutuel wagering facilities; bingo; Jai-alai; and other sporting events that permit wagering. Supporting Products or Services. Companies that provide services in casinos that are fundamental to gambling operations, such as credit lines, consulting services, or gambling technology and technology support. Ownership by a Gambling Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company with gambling involvement. Ownership of a Gambling Company. The company owns more than 20% of another company with gambling involvement. (When a company owns more than 50% of company with gambling involvement, KLD treats the gambling company as a consolidated subsidiary.) (GAM-con-X): Gambling Other Concern The company derives substantial revenues from the activities closely associated with the production of goods and services closely related to the gambling industry or lottery industries [KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002].
TOBACCO (TOB-con-A): Licensing
The company licenses its company name or brand name to tobacco products. Manufacturers. The company produces tobacco products, including cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, and smokeless tobacco products. Manufacturers of Products Necessary for Production of Tobacco Products. The company derives 15% or more of total revenues from the production and supply of raw materials and other products necessary for the production of tobacco products. Retailers. The company derives 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (wholesale or retail) of tobacco products. Ownership by a Tobacco Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company with tobacco involvement. Ownership of a Tobacco Company. The company owns more than 20% of another company with tobacco involvement. (When a company owns more than 50% of company with tobacco involvement, KLD treats the tobacco company as a consolidated subsidiary).
(TOB-con-X): Tobacco Other Concern The company derives substantial revenues from the production of tobacco products [added in 2002] .
FIREARMS (FIR-con-A): Manufacturers. The company is engaged in the production of small arms ammunition or firearms, including, pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns, or sub-machine guns. Retailers. The company derives 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (wholesale or retail) of firearms and small arms ammunition. Ownership by a Firearms Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company with firearms involvement. Ownership of a Firearms Company. The company owns more than 20% of another company with firearms involvement. (When a company owns more than 50% of company with firearms involvement, KLD treats the firearms company as a consolidated subsidiary) [added in 1999] .
in the transport of nuclear power materials and nuclear plant maintenance. Ownership of Nuclear Power Plants. The company has an ownership interest or operates nuclear power plant(s). Does not include publicly traded companies that are an owner or operator of a nuclear plant that has shut down and is being decommissioned. Ownership by a Nuclear Power Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company with nuclear power involvement. Ownership of a Nuclear Power Company. The company owns more than 20% of another company with nuclear power involvement. If company ownership of company with nuclear power involvement is greater than 50%, KLD treats subsidiary as a consolidated subsidiary. social characteristics. The eligible universe is the 3000 largest U.S. Equity; KLD uses a two-step screening process for selecting companies for the DSI 400; first excludes from consideration companies involved in Controversial Business; second KLD selects companies that have positive ESG records and evaluates companies in the context of their industry, sector, market capitalization and S&P 500 status.
Companies are selected as potential candidates for the DS400 based on an assessment of the current index composition and anticipated future changes to the index. KLD ensures that there are sufficient approved candidates to meet the various need of the index at any point of time. KLD selects candidates from the universe of financially qualified companies that meet one or more of the following criteria:
• ESG performance The FTSE KLD 400 is maintained at 400 constituents at all times. An index addition is made only if a vacancy is created by an index removal and addition are selected from a list of approved companies. Furthermore KLD seeks to maintain the composition of Index holdings at approximately 90% large cap companies, 9% mid cap companies, chosen for sector diversification, and 1% small cap companies with exemplary social and environmental records.
Once a company has been selected as a FTSE KLD 400 potential, it undergoes a rigorous evaluation by the sector analyst. He completes a comprehensive evaluation from their recommendation detailing why the company should or should not be added to the Index. Companies that have positive social and environmental records are evaluated on the following issues: community relations, diversity, employee relations, human rights, product quality and safety, and environment and corporate governance. The companies are analyzed in the context of their industry and sector as well as in relation to the broader market.
Companies that are identified as having deteriorating a ESG performance in one or more of the qualitative issue areas may be added to the FTSE KLD 400 watch list. The FTSE KLD 400 Committee will monitor the company's progress and continue to engage the company, until it decides to remove the company from the watch list or remove the company from the index. The FTSE KLD 400 committee may remove companies from the index at any time due to the corporate actions, concerns about financial quality, failure of ESG screens, deteriorating ESG performance or lack of social representation.
